The war against Mexican drug cartels is often portrayed as a war against a criminal operation taking place in Mexico. Furthermore, it is also portrayed as a problem between the United States and Mexico.

However, we would argue as we have done repeatedly in the past that drug cartels constitute, willingly and unwillingly, part of an asymmetric war not only against the United States but against many countries in the region, as well. This asymmetric war is sometimes intentional and sometimes unintentional. It sometimes has clear targets and sometimes not. We have strong reasons to believe that the U.S and Latin American policy makers have failed to understand this situation in Latin America and consequently are failing to develop policies capable of responding to this phenomenon.

The concept of asymmetric war was revived in the continent by the distribution in the Venezuelan army of a book called “The Peripheral War and Revolutionary Islam”, written by a Spanish anarchist, Jorge Verstringe. The book was distributed in order to inject the army with a new military doctrine. That doctrine basically lauds radical Islamist methods as well as terrorist warfare. The idea of asymmetric war is that suicide bombers, terrorists, as well as the use of nuclear and biological weapons could be adopted to achieve a political goal.

Of course, this is a very serious challenge as we have seen by the implementation of this doctrine by Venezuela’s pursuit of nuclear technology and it’s close alliance with Iran (which itself has invested in the development of nuclear capabilities and terrorist tactics more than on conventional warfare). Likewise, the Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, and his allies President Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Evo Morales of Bolivia have strengthened links with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and with extra regional terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, the Spanish Basque ETA, and others.

These activities could be aimed at consolidating totalitarian states or using terrorist groups and Iran operatives to frighten the population and perform assassinations. Terrorist or Iranian groups could help duplicate the regular forces of the police and the army, and create a force detached from the people but capable of carrying out a brutal repression. These terrorist groups could also serve as subversive forces in countries the Bolivarian revolution views as enemies or counterrevolutionary.

The Italian daily “Corriere Della Sera” reported early in September that Hezbollah is setting up a base of operations in Cuba. Most recently, and not coincidentally the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia hosted a visit from the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ahmad Vajidi responsible for the attacks on the Jewish headquarters in Buenos Aires in 1994. Bolivian Congresswoman, Jessica Echeverria recently denounced the presence of Iranian revolutionary guards in Bolivia. She also pointed out that the Bolivian national assembly approved a law that exempts Iranians from obtaining visas in order to enter the country.

All the elements we mentioned that are part of the asymmetric war have strong relations to drug cartels. As a simple example the Hezbollah group that is setting up the base of operations in Cuba received instructions to establish contact with drug traffickers.

Although the strong connection between regional terrorist groups and Hezbollah with drug cartels is a long known fact, it is often understood only as a casual relation of convenience. We would argue, however, that it is more than that.

Drug Cartels and Asymmetric War.

It is Professor Max Mainwaring, an expert in military strategy at the Strategic Studies Institute in Washington DC, who understands the concept of asymmetric war in a most comprehensive way. An asymmetric war includes not just non-conventional warfare such as nuclear war and terrorist guerilla attacks but is comprised of highly complex political-psychological acts.

In addition, Mexican drug cartels are involved in a number of criminal activities besides drug trafficking; including extortion, kidnapping, piracy and money laundering and human traffic. Cartels fight and compete with each other and involve police, security forces, legal institutions and the political class. These institutions of law and order become part of the criminal apparatus.

Drug cartels do not necessarily seek violence in order to pursue a political goal as terrorist groups and rogue states do. However, in the words of Mainwaring, they are “capable of challenging the stability, security, and effective sovereignty of the nation-state. Thus, we see the erosion of democracy and the erosion of the state. In these terms, the internal security situation in Mexico is well beyond a simple law enforcement problem. It is also a socio-political problem and a national security issue with implications beyond Mexico’s borders”.

Indeed, if state authority collapses giving way to anarchy and criminality, society itself deteriorates up to the point of becoming vulnerable as the law turns into ashes. Social and individual life turns, in the words of Mainwaring, “nasty, brutish, and short”. Such vulnerability is the result of a power vacuum that could be taken over by any force capable of restoring order or co-existing with this gangster state. Democracy also collapses as the psychologically devastated people begin to request the presence of a strong leader. People demand order and thus they elect a leader that could lead them into further chaos. In the case of Latin America, this situation could pave the way for a Chavez-supported leader who is likely to exploit a situation of instability and popular discontent.

Drug cartels are not interested in taking over the reins of government. Mostly, live within the framework of a weak or an accomplice state. Rather, they are interested in the profits. They have no political agenda per se. However, it is precisely politically motivated forces such as Hugo Chavez, the Bolivarian revolutionaries, the FARC and the Iranians that would exploit this situation politically. Since these elements are also friendly to the drug cartels, it would be far easier for the anti-American pro-Chavez forces to take over states weakened by the drug cartels. If those forces seize these countries, Iran, Hezbollah and the FARC will increase their leverage and influence astronomically. A deteriorated state enables the deepening of the Bolivarian revolution and Iranian penetration in the continent. The decline and perversion of the state is not a unique Mexican phenomenon. It is unfortunately expanding to Central America and it is expected to expand even further.

Furthermore, drug cartels provide logistical help to subversive forces as well as to Iran. The criminal activities of the drug cartels and their ambitious search for high profit have made them develop a network of connections and logistical knowledge that can serve these wicked political forces.

Last, drug cartels could seek some cooperation with terrorist groups in achieving goals such as assassinations or other sorts of activity. In exchange, cartels can provide money resources to these groups, particularly now that Chavez’s resourcefulness is contrasted with a deteriorating economic situation in Venezuela. Moreover, Iran is facing serious economic challenges as sanctions against them have spread around the world making it more difficult for them to fund asymmetric wars. Drug cartels can be a solution and a source of strength for the political forces that threaten to destabilize the region.

This is why it should not be surprising that Chavez has offered Venezuelan ports and airports to the drug cartels. Drug cartels are associated with terrorist groups, who work together on logistics and share common enemies, serve as a tool to Chavez, his allies, and Iran in destroying the foundations of state and society. While Chavez seeks to expand the hegemony of the Bolivarian revolution, Iranians seek to expand their influence in the region and their ability to threaten its main enemy, the United States. The Iranians are already doing it by encouraging terrorism or by attempting to establish missiles on Venezuelan soil.

The drug cartels are a key political weapon and along with Venezuela’s oil machine, constitute the fuel on which the vehicle of evil travels and is a key component of the asymmetric war.

The U.S Response

The Merida Initiative is the primary U.S response to this serious set of circumstances. This program is positively designed as a security agreement between the United States and Mexico as well as Central American countries in order to combat the threat of drug trafficking and organized crime. The plan indeed includes technical assistance and equipment but also aid in strengthening the mechanisms of law enforcement. Likewise, this aid aims at strengthening the rule of law in all the countries mentioned above.

The plan also establishes a mechanism that can detect ships departing from ports located far away in the region. Furthermore, countries in the Caribbean requested the U.S government to extend the Merida Initiative to their countries.

The Merida Initiative could definitely be a very powerful tool to chase away not only the drug cartels but also terrorist groups. However, it will be impossible for the Merida Initiative to achieve its full potential if the big picture is not fully understood. The fight against the cartels is not only a fight against a criminal entity that pursues an illegal economic goal but has to be understood against the background of a very effective revolutionary movement coming from Caracas coupled with the presence of Iran. These elements have become important factors in the equation and they pursue a whole set of different political and strategic goals. As stated by Douglas Farah in his book “Into the Abyss”: “The Venezuela-Iran axis, of which Bolivia is a crucial part, poses a threat to regional stability and democracy. Because of the ties of Iran and Venezuela to active terrorist groups and their stated purpose to work toward the destruction of the United States, the same axis poses a significant threat to the United States”.

Thus, to our knowledge, the U.S. government has not developed a response yet to a report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that Chavez has become partner of the drug cartels. Likewise, there has not been a reaction to serious reports about training of FARC (and probably other) terrorists in Venezuela, or the connections between the FARC and drug cartels to the government of Rafael Correa in Ecuador. (Both denounced by the Colombian government and in the findings of the Reyes Files). Likewise, the Iranian presence in the area has long been defined as non-threatening despite the fact that there have been reports on Hezbollah’s presence and cooperation with drug cartels in several areas of the continent and the fact that Iran is planning to place missiles on Venezuelan soil. Similarly, Venezuela has not been punished for violating the sanctions against Iran.

The different U.S. Administrations (Bush and Obama) have chosen not to confront Hugo Chavez. The State Department believes that diplomacy and good manners can avoid a backlash in a region that is already filled with left wing governments with a negative view of the United States. This same policy has been taking place, particularly since the attempted coup d’état against Chavez in 2002 and certainly after the Iraq war (which aggravated anti-American feelings in the region). Chavez, despite his intentions, is still courted by U.S diplomats as if anything would change his uncompromising and stubborn behavior. Correa and Morales have dismantled U.S military bases and expelled Drug Enforcement Agency personnel, that constituted an integral part of the war against drug trafficking. The Bolivian and Ecuadorian leaders are still being treated with diplomacy and caution and sometimes with acclaim (particularly when they win their ill-intended referendums and elections). Their growing relation with Iran has not been effectively challenged even if it violates sanctions imposed by the United Nations.

If those countries are becoming bastions of drugs, terrorism and support for Iran, can we expect the Merida plan to solve all the problems? If drug cartels can count on Bolivarian Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia and Ecuador; and; if they cooperate with radical Islamic Iran, Hezbollah and the anti-Colombian FARC, the Merida Initiative needs to be complemented by a more aggressive and decisive policy.

The Merida Initiative should be seen as a means to eliminate the drug cartels as an effective force of state and law destruction. However, those political players that are part of the equation are being ignored for reasons that are not at all clear. The only way to fight this asymmetric war is by developing a comprehensive plan that is not just technical and military but that is also political. The real enemies have not yet been fully recognized. Not only the U.S. must recognize the asymmetric war but also all the countries that are beneficiaries of the Merida Initiative. Otherwise, the Merida Initiative is likely to fail.

Luis Fleischman and Nancy Menges are editors of the Americas Report, a publication of the Menges Hemispheric Security Project at the Center for Security Policy

Source: TheAmericasReport.com