Almost six years of intense security operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by the administration of President Álvaro Uribe are beginning to produce tangible results. Government forces killed several important rebel field commanders in 2007 and two members of the central command in March 2008, including second-in-command Raúl Reyes, and have severely disrupted insurgent communications, prompting a loss of internal cohesion and decreasing illegal revenues.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN Strategy), which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 8 September 2006 includes a broad range of measures aimed at addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building States. counterterrorism capacities, strengthening the role of the UN system in the provision and facilitation of capacity building assistance; and ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The Strategy identifies national governments as having primary responsibility for its implementation, while highlighting the supporting role that different parts of the UN system, regional and sub-regional bodies, and civil society should play in ensuring its effective implementation. By enumerating a holistic approach to addressing the terrorist threat, the Strategy represents a convergence of the global North.s post-11 September...

A three-year peace process between the government of Alvaro Uribe and the left-wing National Liberation Army (ELN) is at a standstill, with concern rising that it is doomed by mutual recalcitrance. The insurgent group, while much smaller than the more prominent (and notorious) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is probably both militarily stronger than the government believes and politically weaker than its leaders think. To counteract the spread of frustration and prevent failure, the government and the rebels should immediately explore creative options, as much to begin to establish some badly needed mutual confidence as to tackle the persistent procedural and substantive bottlenecks.

This 34-page report is accompanied by an extensive photo and audio slideshow, and documents the impact on civilian survivors of guerrillas’ use of antipersonnel landmines in Colombia, as well as the difficulties that such survivors face in obtaining needed assistance from the government.

The disbanding of the paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) between 2003 and 2006 is seen by the administration of President Alvaro Uribe as a vital step toward peace. While taking some 32,000 AUC members out of the conflict has certainly altered the landscape of violence, there is growing evidence that new armed groups are emerging that are more than the simple “criminal gangs” that the government describes. Some of them are increasingly acting as the next generation of paramilitaries, and they require a more urgent and more comprehensive response from the government.